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THE MODEL OF PRINCIPLES
GEORGE C. CHRISTIE*
H.L.A. Hart's work has dominated much of current jurisprudential__
discussion. In a recent article evaluating Hart's conclusion that the
law consists of sets of rules in the application of which judges often
have a large measure of discretion, Professor Dworkin of Yale con-
cluded that judges do not in fact possess any such discretion because
the judicial application of legal rules is controlled by what he calls
legal principles. The author takes exception with Dworkin's conclu-
sions and attacks the analytical framework of rules and principles
upon which it is based.
N The Model of Rules which was published recently,1 Professor Dworkin
expands a theory of judicial discretion which he had previously an-
nounced a few years ago in describing the nature of a judicial decision.2
His thesis then was that it is wrong to say that a judge is ever free to de-
cide cases any way he wishes even in those cases when there seems to be
no binding authority on the point at issue. In his recent article he elabo-
rates this contention in the course of criticizing the legal positivists'
notion of judicial discretion. I believe that Professor Dworkin's theory of
judicial discretion, which he has presented with great clarity, ability, and
persuasiveness, is founded upon a faulty analytical base, and that what-
ever germ of truth his theory may or may not have, Dworkin has thus
far been unable to supply any support for it. In the present article, I
propose to demonstrate why my conclusions are justified. I must first,
however, describe the context out of which Professor Dworkin has de-
veloped this theory and then try to state Dworkin's interesting theory of
judicial discretion as succinctly as I can.
I. THE PosITmIVsT THEORY OF JUDICIAL DIscRETION
Any discussion of legal positivism must begin with a reference to the
work of John Austin. For Austin all positive law could be recognized
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as being the command, either tacit or express, of the sovereign.3 The
sovereign, in turn, was the uncommanded commander, i.e., that deter-
minate person (or persons) who was habitually obeyed by the bulk of a
particular political society and who in turn was not habitually obedient
to any other determinate person (or persons). 4 The purpose of Austin's
analysis was to provide an empirical test whereby rational men could agree
on what was and what was not the law in any particular political society
at any particular time. The difficulties in Austin's theory of the sovereign,
in his theory of law as a set of commands, and in his concurrent theory of
sanctions, which Austin viewed as an essential part of each individual
law,5 have been so often explored in the legal literature that no more than
a passing reference to that literature is now required.6 To meet these
difficulties, while at the same time accomplishing the same purpose for
which Austin's theory was designed, namely to provide an objective means
of determining what is and what is not the law in a given political society,
Austin's greatest and most sympathetic modern critic, Professor H.L.A.
Hart, has put forward a theory which has dominated much of recent
scholarly discussion on the nature of law.7 Professor Hart rejects the
notion that law is best viewed as a series of commands. The essential
characteristic of any functioning legal system, he maintains, is not so
much that people generally obey the law, but that they feel bound by the
law. Professor Hart thus distinguishes between what he calls being
obliged to obey the law-i.e., the idea of being forced to obey the law
that is connoted in the command/sanction theory of law-and what he
for Law-A Critique, 1 VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 215 (1967). For further insights
into Dworkin's views about -the nature of the judicial process, many of which I share,
see Dworkin, Does Law Have a Function?, 74 YA E LEJ. 640 (1965), originally pub-
lished as Wasserstrom: The Judicial Decision, 75 ETmics 47 (1964).
3J. AUsTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 9-33 (Library of
Ideas ed. 1954). For the sake of conciseness I 'have had to compress a great deal of
Austin's description of the law to arrive at the statements in the text. With regard
to -the particular point being made in the text at this note, it should be indicated
that not all commands of the sovereign, but only those general commands requiring
the acts or forbearances of a class, are law. Id. at 19, 24. Particular commands are
not law. For -the statement that commands can be tacit see id. at 32.
'Id. at 193-94.
rId. at 14-17.
'See H. HART, Tim CONCEPT OF LAW 1-76 (1961). See also A. HAoERSTROM,
INQuIREs INTO THm NATuR OF LAW AND MoRALS 20-35 (Broad transl. 1953); H.
KELsEN, GENERAL THEORY oF LAW AND STATE 30-32, 62-64 (Wedberg transl. 1961).
There are many more references to Austin and discussions of his theory in the works
of Hagerstrom, and particularly Kelsen, cited herein.
I H. HART, supra note 6.
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calls having an obligation to obey -the law.8 Hart finds this idea of ac-
ceptance, or of felt obligation, in the notion of rules. Rules not only
prescribe what people are supposed to do, but, to those who accept the
validity of a particular rule or system of rules, they provide a reason for
acting in accordance with a particular rule over and above the unpleasant
consequences that might result from a failure to observe or obey the rule.9
Hart therefore believes that the legal system of any reasonably ad-
vanced society can be best described as the union of what he calls pri-
mary and secondary rules. 10 Primary rules typically prescribe what the
citizens should or should not do, such as pay their taxes and not murder
one another or smoke in a department store." Secondary rules, on the
other hand, prescribe how primary rules are to be changed or interpreted
or applied. Secondary rules typically are concerned with the allocation
of basic political power in a society. They prescribe who can make law,
who can amend law, and who can adjudicate disputes arising under a
legal system. The fundamental secondary rule in a society Hart calls a rule
of recognition.12 It prescribes who is the ultimate lawmaker (or law
making body) in the society and the conditions under which he (or it)
can make law. The authority of all subordinate lawmakers must be traced
back to the rule of recognition. Similarly, the validity of all other rules
in the legal system must be traced back to this same rule of recognition
in the sense that (1) they must be made by someone whose authority
can be traced back to the ultimate lawmaker described in the rule of
recognition and (2) their content must not contravene some prohibition
contained in the rule of recognition that limits the content of the valid
rules of the legal system. The validity of the rule of recognition, of
8 d. at 79-88.
'Id.
'O Id. at 89-96.
11 In Hart's analysis primary rules probably also prescribe how citizens go
about doing certain things such as making wills or adopting children, id. at 94, al-
though they are concerned with powers, the characteristic of secondary rules, rather
than obligations, which are the overriding characteristic of primary rules. Id. at
78. Nevertheless, when dividing the rules of a complex functioning legal system, the
powers conferred by rules prescribing how wills are to be made are too trivial to be
classed with the secondary rules of recognition, change and adjudication. Hart is
criticized for using these somewhat differing methods for distinguishing between
primary and secondary rules, i.e., for shifting from a power creating-obligation cre-
ating distinction to something like a constitutional law-ordinary law distinction. See
Sartorius, The Concept of Law, 52 ARCmV. FuR REcsTs-uND-SozALPmLosoPME
161, 165-68, 175 (1966).12 H. HART, supra note 6, at 97-107.
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course, cannot be determined by reference to any other higher rule.
Rather, its validity must depend, in the last analysis, upon its acceptance
by the people living in the particular society under the legal system gen-
erated by the rule of recognition. In other words, when the word validity
is applied to the rule of recognition, we are not asking a question about
the internal relations, of a system of rules but a question of fact about
the rule's acceptance. Moreover, since the validity of the rule of recog-
nition depends upon its acceptance by at least the bulk of the individuals
comprising the society, and since one can never be certain of exactly what
it is that most of those individuals actually accept, any statement of the
rule of recognition prevailing in any particular society will be hypothetical
in nature. It will be an attempt to express, for the purpose of explaining
the legal system of a given society, the ultimate organizing principle of that
society.J3
But to state that the legal system of a society is best considered as
the union of primary and secondary rules does not exhaust the range of
"Id. at 106-07. See also id. at 144-50. It should be emphasized that Hart's
rule of recognition is itself a rule of law, the existence and content of which must be
shown, and not a juristic hypothesis, such as Kelsen's grundnorm or basic norm, the
validity of which is pre-supposed. See H. KELSEN, supra note 6, at 115-16. As a
rule of law, it presumably must also, as discussed in the text, be able to pass the test
of validity. Because there is no consistent test of validity which can be used to test
both the rule of recognition and the rules of law derived from it, Harts theory has
been attacked as both incomplete and inaccurate. See Sartorius, supra note 11, at
1i80-81.: This criticism has been given impetus by Iart's concession that the term
"validity" is properly applied in describing relationships within a system and not in
describing the relationship of the system or some part of it to external phenomena.
He does not use the term validity when discussing the rule of recognition but talks
instead in terms of its acceptance. See H. HART, supra note 6, at 105-06. While I
would disagree that it is incorrect usage to describe this latter relationship in terms
of validity-at the very most it is an uncommon use of the term validity-I believe
Sartorius' criticism is unfounded for more basic reasons. When using the term va-
lidity within a system, we mean, under Hart's theory, that a rule is accepted as being
part of the legal system because it is derived from the rule of recognition. When we
say that a rule is the rule of recognition of the legal system of a given society we
mean that it is accepted as such by the members of that society. What Sartorius
seems to be saying is that one cannot use two tests of acceptance (or validity) in the
same theory. I frankly see no reason why this must be so. I believe that part of
Sirtorius' problem arises from his belief that Hart's rule of recognition in the United
States would be almost exhaustively stated by the description of what we would call
American constitutional law and is thus valid in the same manner that other law is.
Satorius, supra note 11, at 186-90. I do not believe that Hart would agree (see
citations at the beginning of this note), and I certainly do not. There are vast and
imbojiant areas concerning the authority of the executive and of the Congress that
have never been the subject of litigation and as to which people's beliefs about the
scope of the powers involved are far more relevant than the already decided cases.
[Vol. 1968: 649
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relevant discussion. What is it that a judge does when, in the course of
being called upon to adjudicate a dispute arising under the legal system,
he applies the law? Since, under the usual positivist view, the law con-
sists of a set of rules, the judge must obviously apply one or more of
these rules to the dispute before him. According to Hart these rules have
in varying degrees a central core of meaning but are also open-textured. 14
The further the factual nature of the controversy departs from the factual
situation subsumed under the core meaning of the rule, the more debatable
is the conclusion that the judge can decide the dispute before him merely
by applying any pre-existing rule. In these situations most positivists,
including Professor Hart, would say that in the exercise of power validly
delegated to him, the judge must make law and in effect function as a legis-
lator. Putting the matter another way, the judge in these circumstances
is said to have the discretion to decide the case as he wishes or, perhaps
more correctly, to have the discretion within limits to decide the case as
he wishes. It is this point which Professor Dworkin wishes to contest.
He denies that in such circumstances the judge has discretion, in any
nontrivial sense of that term, to decide the case in any manner he wishes.1 s
It is not that Dworkin believes the judge's discretion in such situations to
be more limited than the positivists maintain-and Dworkin uses Hart's
theory as the most coherent positivist view-but rather that it is just plain
error to say, in any nontrivial sense, that the judge has discretion to decide
the case as he will. And this is so even when it is impossible for outside
observers to predict, before the fact, how the judge will decide the case.
Because Dworkin believes any theory maintaining that judges do have
such discretion to be wrong, he therefore concludes that a theory such as
Hart's, which attempts to elucidate the notion of a legal system exclusively.
in terms of a set or sets of rules, however large, is incomplete and in-
adequate. For Dworkin believes that the demonstrably false notion that
judges have discretion in a strong or nontrivial sense is a logical conse-
quence of any theory of law that focuses exclusively on rules.' 6 Hence in
The Model of Rules he concludes that "[i]f we shake ourselves loose from
this model of rules, we may be able to build a model truer to the com-
plexity and sophistication of our own practices."'"
'
4 H. HART, supra note 6, at 120-32.
1 Dworkin, supra note 1, at 31. See also id. at 39-40.
'Id. at 39-40.
"Id. at 46. For a somewhat similar but less rigorous and in" many ways les
objectionable criticism of Hart, see Hughes, Rules, Policy and Decision Making,77
YALE L.J. 411 (1968). Hughes feels that Hart is restricted to a narrow notion of
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II. THE MODEL OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Professor Dworkin distinguishes two weak or trivial senses of dis-
cretion from the strong or nontrivial sense mentioned above.18 One of
these trivial senses of the term would be used to describe the situation in
which a sergeant was ordered by his lieutenant to choose his five most
experienced men for a patrol. Since in the context it might be difficult
to decide who the sergeant's five most experienced men are, we might
wish to recognize this fact by stating that the sergeant's orders left him
some discretion in the matter. If the choice were unusually difficult we
might want to say that the sergeant's orders left him a great deal of dis-
cretion. We would use the second weak or trivial sense of discretion if
we wished to describe the position of the umpire behind home plate in
a baseball game. The rules of baseball prescribe quite explicitly what is a
ball and what is a strike. The umpire behind home plate not only calls
the balls and strikes, but he is also the umpire-in-chief. Consequently, his
decisions as to what are balls and what are strikes are final. We might
therefore wish to recognize this fact by stating that the calling of balls and
strikes is left to the discretion of the umpire. In both these situations the
judgment of the official in question, in one case the sergeant and in the
other the umpire-in-chief, is governed by precise standards. In the one
case, however, it is difficult to apply this standard in a particular context
and in the other, whether the application of the standard is difficult or
not, the official's decision is final and not subject to review. Dworkin
asserts that it is certainly true that judges often have discretion in these
two weak senses, but, in the stronger sense of discretion which is presented
in a case where our sergeant is ordered to send five men on patrol and
he is free to choose any of his men, Dworkin denies that judges have such
discretion. In other words, the fact that judges can be wrong or that their
decisions may not be completely predictable does not mean that judges
have discretion to decide as they wish, nor does the fact that judges are
often the final arbiters of particular issues mean that they have such dis-
cretion.
To explain why Dworkin reaches this conclusion, which to many
lawyers may seem counter-intuitive, requires some reconstruction of how
what rules are and ignores the vaguer principles and still vaguer maxims which are
also rules and which are often intertwined in the statements of the narrower rules
with clear core meanings with which Hart is concerned. See id. at 424, 436-37.18 Dworkln, supra note 1, at 32-34.
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Professor Dworkin views the legal system. Dworkin agrees that, whatever
else a legal system may include, it contains rules. More crucial for the
present discussion is Dworkin's notion as to what legal rules are. They
are, first of all, legal prescriptions such that, if they are applicable to the
facts of a controversy before a judge, they are binding upon him.19 In
other words, they must either be applied whenever they are applicable or
else overruled. Secondly, Dworkin postulates that it is always possible
to state whether or not a rule is applicable and therefore binding in a
particular case. For this reason he maintains that it must be practically
possible, albeit often difficult, to state exhaustively a legal rule, that is, to
include within the statement of the rule all of its exceptions. 20 Dworkin's
sources of rules are the traditional ones, namely statutes and precedents.
The crucial question for purposes of an examination of the notion
of judicial discretion is what happens when, using Dworkin's concept of
rules, (1) we determine that no discoverable rule is applicable, i.e., is
binding upon the judge in the particular case under consideration or (2)
a judge wishes to overrule a rule which he has determined to be applicable
and thus binding upon him. Since Dworkin rejects the notion that judges
have discretion in the strong sense, they cannot, in the absence of applicable
rules, decide the case as they wish. How then is their decision circum-
scribed? Or, to put the matter another way, how is their discretion in
such a case turned into a weak sense of the term discretion? Since we
spoke in terms of a weak sense of discretion when a decision had to be
made in accordance with standards (cf. the sergeant and the umpire), we
obviously need to discover some applicable standards. Dworkin believes
that he has discovered these applicable standards in what he calls prin-
ciples.21 For Dworkin, principles, like rules, are entities that antecede the
particular cases in which they are applied-they have a source external
to the deciding judge. Furthermore, the principles a judge might use in
justifying a decision have usually received varying degrees of legal recog-
nition in statutes and in past cases. It is not essential, however, that
they have received any such recognition although the degree of weight
that a principle carries as a reason for decision will be very vitally affected
by the degree of official recognition it has received in the past.22 The
important thing for Dworkin is that principles are different than rules.
'1 Id. at 25.
20 Id. See also id. at 26 (where principles are distinguished from rules).
21 Id. at 22-31.
"See id. at 41-42. See also id. at 22-3 1.
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They cannot be exhaustively stated as can rules and (therefore?), unlike
rules, they do not absolutely control the judge's decision2 3 In other
words, to say that a principle is applicable is only to say that it is relevant.24
Quaere, is a judge bound to appreciate that a particular principle is ap-
plicable in a given case? If the retreat to a higher level of abstraction
in order to show that a judge's choices are always controlled is accepted,
it would seem that a judge is bound to appreciate the applicability of rel-
evant principles.
The important remaining question for Dworkin is deciding the com-
parative weight of competing principles cited to and used by a court. For,
unlike rules again, two or more principles can and almost certainly will be
applicable to any particular case. Dworkin admits that this is a difficult
case.25 .Even if his theory is otherwise true, it will thus founder unless he
can demonstrate how we are to decide the weight to be assigned different
principles. Presumably in his forthcoming book, of which The Model of
Rules is a chapter,26 he will provide some enlightenment on that subject.
Whether or not Professor Dworkin will be able to come up with an ac-
ceptable theory for assigning weight to competing principles, however, is
not the point.I wish to pursue in this article. I reject his distinction be-
tween rules and principles and particularly the analysis upon which it
is based. I hope to justify this rejection in the discussion which follows.
If I succeed in so doing, I shall then have shown that Dworkin has not
proved his case that judges cannot be said ever to possess discretion in the
strong sense, since he rested that case on a clear-cut logical distinction
between rules and principles. At the very most an examination of his
theory may lead us to question whether any theory which looks at law
exclusively or primarily or even partially as a collection of rules is
adequate. But this is another matter and that the law can at least be
partially, although not completely, described in terms of rules is a prop-
osition which Dworkin is not disposed to question.
Ill. THE EVIDENCE EXAMINED
Dworkin's analysis is based on two very basic assumptions about
the nature of legal rules neither of which I think is justified. The first
is that it is possible, although perhaps often difficult, to state a legal rule
11 Id. at 25-26. See also id. at 35-36.
2"Id. at 26.
2 Id. at 27.
'26 d. at 14 (unnumbered footnote).
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completely so that its statement includes all situations to which it is ap-
plicable and excludes all situations to which it is not applicable. 27 In
other words, the complete statement of a rule must and can include. a state-
ment of all exceptions to the rule. Principles are distinguished from
rules in that they cannot be so stated. I think this view as to the nature
of rules is clearly erroneous. Dworkin gives no examples of the complete
statement of a legal rule but assumes it can be done. But what are legal
rules? They are nothing but abstractions which scholars writing articles,
lawyers arguing cases or preparing opinions, and judges deciding cases
formulate as a result of examining the past cases and statutes on point.
There are no authoritative statements of the rules of the common law,
let alone any complete statements of such rules, authoritative or other-
wise.28 Even the so-called rules of real property law in the heyday of
Blackstone and Kent were never complete statements of when and where
they were applicable and it is extremely doubtful that it ever was possible
so to state them. There were exceptions to the Rule in Shelley's Case and
it was never possible to state with certainty the complete class of these
exceptions. 29 Indeed, in a case involving the so-called Rule of Shelmer's
2 See note 20 supra.
" As for that chimaera the ratio decidendi of a case, the best minds in the pro-
fession have joined in the search for it, but they have disagreed among themselves
even with respect to what it is they are searching for. Cf. G. WiLLiAMs, LEARnuNa
THE LAW 71-77 (7th ed. 1963). Compare Goodhart, Determining the Ratio De-
cidendi of a Case, 40 YALE LJ. 161 (1930), with Gooderson, Ratio Decidendi and
Rules of Law, 30 CAN. B. REv. 892 (1952). For a general review of the subject see
J. STONE, LEGAL SYsTEM AND LAvYRS' REASONiNGS 267-80 (1964). See also K.
LLEwELLYN, Tin BRAMBLE BusH 56-69 (1951 ed.); Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi
of a Case and the Doctrine of Binding Precedent, OxFoRD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
148 (1961).
"I' A modem attempt at the statement of the Rule in Shelley's Case is contained
in RESTATEmENT OF PROPERTY §§ 31, 312, and 313 (1936). In the principle section,
Section 312, the very lengthy statement of the Rule is stated to be subject to the
exception of "when the estate for life is subject to a condition precedent which does
not also attach to the remainder." In a Caveat at the end of Section 312 the follow-
ing appears: "The Institute takes no position as to the set of facts excepted from the
rule stated in Subsection (1) by the words, 'except when the estate for life is subject
to a condition precedent which does not also attach to the remainder.' The authority
upon this set of facts is insufficient to permit the statement of a rule applicable
thereto." In a special note to this same section the American Law Institute also
pointed out that its statement of the Rule in Shelley's Case was only applicable when
the ancestor is given a life estate. Earlier authorities had said the rule applied when-
ever the ancestor was given a freehold interest, but the Institute declared, that an
absence of American authority on point and the Institutes desire "to expend its
energies in the restating of the living law, where its efforts may be helpful to the
profession, have caused the statement of the rule in the Blackletter in the limited
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case which concerned the meaning to be given to the word "money" in
the construction of a will, the House of Lords criticized the attempts by
past judges to enunciate some complete rule on the subject when faced
with the need to construe some particular will.30 When one leaves the
fields of real property and of wills, any attempt to state completely some
rule of the common law is hopeless. Every attempt to state an inclusive
rule for when a man will be held to have negligently injured another has
foundered. The Restatements of Law were never intended to be complete
statements of the law in this sense, either as it was, is, or should be.31
Witness the Restatements' frequent use of caveats to make this clear in
many particular situations. Furthermore, the Restatements of Law were
never intended to be enacted into law to serve as codes for the field
of contracts or of torts or of real property. Finally, even in the case of
statutes which are officially enacted in a particular verbal form, no one
can pretend that he is able to state their complete meaning. First of all,
the language of any statute is, in varying degrees, vague.32 This vague-
ness is almost never completely resolved by the course of judicial interpre-
tation. In the second place, courts are continually reading exceptions in-
to statutes and it is impossible to state that the range of possible exceptions
has been exhausted. Returning to Dworkin's precise point, one can never
state with any degree of confidence, let alone certainty, exactly what at
any particular moment is and is not within the coverage of the statute. 33
form." Thus, leaving aside the exceptions, there was still some small doubt as to
what exactly was the core of the Rule.
30 Perrin v. Morgan, [1943] A.C. 399, 408 (speech of Viscount Simon, the
Lord Chancellor). See also Mr. Justice Harlan writing for the Court in Provident
Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 88 S. Ct. 733 (1968): "[The error
made by the Court of Appeals was precisely its reliance on formulas extracted from
their contexts rather than on pragmatic analysis...." Id. at 743 n.16.
3' To pursue the purpose behind the Restatements in depth one should start with
the materials and citations contained in H. M. HART & A. SACKS, ThE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 748-71 (tent. ed. 1958).
Leaving aside the problem that the various Reporters were obliged to choose be-
tween competing authority and sometimes to state a coherent rule where none was
stated in the authorities, it was finally decided, when the initial Restatements were
prepared, only to restate existing law which was admittedly fragmentary and incom-
plete. Since 1953, the American Law Institute has adopted the policy of actually
reflecting the state of the authorities, and whatever conflict there was in the policies
and rules, in the comments to each section of the Restatements.
2ee Christie, Vagueness and Legal Language, 48 MINN. L. REV. 885 (1964).
33 In United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936), a statute un-
qualifiedly forbidding the importation of contraceptive devices into the United States
which had been on the books in substantially the same verbal form since 1873 was
construed to prohibit such importation only when it was for "immoral purposes."
[Vol. 1968: 649
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The second erroneous assumption about the nature of legal rules de-
velops out of the first Dworkin contends that not only can we completely
state a legal rule but that we can definitely ascertain when that rule is
applicable to a given set of facts and when it is not.34 This assumption is
essential, for it is only after we have ascertained that a given factual situa-
tion is not covered by any existing rule, or someone has raised doubts as
to whether as a matter of policy that factual situation should be covered
by a particular rule which does apply, that Dworkin's principles come
into play. Principles in short are used to decide cases not covered by
existing rules, or when we wish to overrule existing legal rules. In all
other situations the applicable legal rule must be applied because, as al-
ready noted, an applicable rule is binding and we can definitely ascertain
when a rule is or is not applicable. As a corollary to these views Dworkin
does not concede that two or more valid legal rules can be applicable to the
same factual situation.35 Only one such rule can be valid and presum-
ably it is the duty of the judges to determine which rule this is and then to
apply it to the case in question.
Dworkin's assumption that the applicability of particular relevant
rules to particular sets of facts can be definitely ascertained, and that the
important issue before the courts is whether to apply the applicable rule
or to create a new one, is the most counter-intuitive of all his points. To
most people schooled in the law the major and by far the most important
and difficult part of most law suits is determining whether some asserted
statute, precedent, or what some people call a rule, is in fact applicable.
In relation to this problem the other problems involved in litigation seem
relatively easy to analyze. Dworkin, however, appears to believe that
determining the applicability of a given rule to a particular factual situation
is not an especially difficult task, but rather one that can be done rel-
atively mechanically.36 I think this is clearly shown by Dworkin's an-
alysis of the cases he cites in support of his overall conclusions about the
model of rules and the nature of judicial discretion. It is to these cases
that I shall now turn.
Importation by physicians was held not to be for "immoral purposes." This and
other examples are discussed in Christie, supra note 32.
"Dworkin, supra note 1, at 25.
Id. at 27.
Dworkin recognizes that the application of a known rule to a set of facts
covered by the rule can be difficult, id. at 37, but the possible difficulty of deciding
whether a rule is applicable to a given set of facts in the 'first place is never adverted
to.
Vol. 1968: 649]
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To demonstrate his point, Dworkin analyzes two well-known cases
decided in different eras, one in 1889 and the other in 1960. If these
cases supported his thesis, Dworkin could argue with some persuasiveness
that he had succeeded in presenting some valuable insight into the funda-
mental and essentially timeless nature of the law. Unfortunately, neither
case supports his thesis. The earlier of the two cases discussed by Dworkin
is Riggs v. Palmer.37 In that case Elmer Palmer, who was the major bene-
ficiary under his grandfather's will, murdered his grandfather in order to
inherit the old man's property. There was some evidence that the grand-
father, who was a widower and who had remarried subsequent to making
the will, had expressed some intention of changing his will. In Dworkin's
view: 38 (1) This was a case which was covered by applicable legal rules,
to wit, the statutes relating to the making, revoking, and probating of wills.
(2) These legal rules, because they were applicable, were binding, unless
changed. (3) These legal rules bound the New York Court of Appeals
to uphold Elmer Palmer's claim under the will. (4) The Court of Ap-
peals rejected Elmer's claim and thus changed the law applicable to
Elmer's case. (5) This change in applicable legal rules was justified by
an appeal to principles, the chief one of which was that no man should
profit by his own wrongdoing. (6) Therefore, the case supports Dwork-
in's distinction between principles and rules. With all due deference, I
must submit that Dworkin's analysis of Riggs v. Palmer is quite inaccurate.
The crucial first step in Dworkin's analysis is that the statutes govern-
ing the making, the revoking, and the probating of wills established a rule
that a beneficiary who murders a testator can nevertheless receive a be-
quest under the testator's will and that this rule stated the law at the time
the action in Riggs v. Palmer was commenced. Where was this rule
stated? There never had been a previous reported case such as this in
New York. The statutes in question talked about the number of witnesses
necessary to make a valid will and similar matters. Nothing remotely
connected with what happens if a beneficiary murders a testator was con-
tained in the statutes. What is more to the point, the New York Court of
Appeals never for one moment conceded that these statutes created a rule of
law that beneficiaries who murder testators can nevertheless take under
37 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889). The portions of this case quoted in the
text are taken from the official report as the Northeastern Reporter's version differs
from the official report in paragraphing and other small technical respects.
38 The case is discussed in a number of places in Dworkin's article, the principle
pages, particularly for my purposes, being Dworkin, supra note 1, at 23-24, 38.
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the testators' wills. It is true, as Dworkin quotes the court to prove his
point, that the court did say,
It is quite true that statutes regulating the making, proof and effect
of wills, and the devolution of property, if literally construed, and if their
force and effect can in no way and under no circumstances be controlled
or modified, give this property to the murderer.39
But even taken alone and completely out of context this statement does not
support Dworkin's conclusion that there was a pre-existing rule of law
that beneficiaries who murder testators can nevertheless take under the
testators' wills. Furthermore, the statement just quoted was not made in
isolation and the context conclusively shows that the court rejected
Dworkin's view as to what the pre-existing rule of law was. The court
declared that it could never have been the intention of the lawmakers to
permit the beneficiary to take in these circumstances. 40 It noted what
Aristotle and others had said about the inevitable deficiencies in any at-
tempt at a general statement of legal norms and the duty of judges to sup-
ply these deficiencies. It also adverted to one of the oldest maxims of
statutory interpretation in existence, namely that statutes are not to be
construed to produce absurd results, and it referred to collections of cases
where general language in a statute was given a limiting construction by the
courts. The court then concluded:
What could be more unreasonable than to suppose that it was the
legislative intention in the general laws passed for the orderly, peaceable
and just devolution of property, that they should have operation in favor
of one who murdered his ancestor that he might speedily come into the
possession of his estate? Such an intention is inconceivable. We need
not, therefore, be much troubled by the general language contained in the
laws.41
The court then went on in a passage partially quoted by Dworkin:
Besides, all laws as well as all contracts may be controlled in their
operation and effect by general, fundamental maxims of the common law.
No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage
of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own inequity, or to
acquire property by his own crime.42
It should be noted that the court did not say even if there were a rule of
law that..., it said besides ....
10 115 N.Y. at 509, 22 N.E. at 189.
"Id. at 509-11, 22 N.E. at 189.
"Id. at 511, 22 N.E. at 190.
"Id.
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After this general discussion the court became more specific. It
noted that the Supreme Court of the United States had held that, sanctity
of contract or not, the beneficiary of a life insurance policy who had
murdered the insured could not recover the proceeds of the insurance.43
The court then went on to point out that it had long since been held that,
statutes on the making, revoking, and probating of wills notwithstanding,
a will procured by fraud could be avoided.44 In the light of these cases
how anyone could assert that there was a settled pre-existing rule that
beneficiaries under wills who murdered testators could still inherit under
the will is beyond me. The dissent in Riggs asserted that there was a rule45
but it never came to grips with the exception for fraud which, as the
majority noted,46 had been recognized in England and other common-law
jurisdictions with a statutory framework similar to that in New York. In
my judgment the dissent's failure to distinguish the fraud exception from
the murder exception makes its assertion about the settled pre-existing law
difficult to accept.47 At any rate the majority never accepted that asser-
tion for a moment.
The second case cited by Dworkin to illustrate this point that there
is a qualitative difference between principles of law and rules of law, that
principles are not a vaguer or more general type of rule but something
entirely different, is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.4s This was a
very complex case with considerably more issues than were involved in
Riggs v. Palmer. The facts were as follows: 49  Mr. Henningsen and his
wife visited an automobile dealer's showroom to look at new Plymouths.
Mr. Henningsen wished to buy his wife a car as a Mother's Day present,
and, according to the Henningsens, this intention was communicated to the
43New York Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886).
"115 N.Y. at 512, 22 N.E. at 190.
45Id. at 515-16, 22 N.E. at 191.
"6 See note 44 supra.
7 Before Riggs v. Palmer, a cautious man could have said at most that New
York's law on the subject was uncertain. The approach to statutory interpretation
taken by the court in Riggs, as well as the result it reached, was criticized in Pound,
Spurious Interpretation, 7 CoLuM. L. REV. 379, 382-83 (1907). Pound is in turn
sharply criticized in H. M. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 31, at 97-102. Hart and
Sacks also point out-and the cases they cite fully support their assertion-that
English courts have had no trouble denying murderers the proceeds of the deceased's
insurance policies or benefits either under the deceased's will or from the deceased's
intestacy, and that the English cases have been followed in Australia and Canada.
Id. at 96.
"8 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
" See id. at 364-69, 161 A.2d at 73-75.
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automobile dealer. After the Henningsens selected a car, a purchase order
was prepared which only Mr. Henningsen executed. The provisions of the
purchase order were printed in various sizes of type with the smallest type
reserved for a statement to the effect that the purchase order comprised the
entire agreement between the parties and that no other agreement or under-
derstanding of any nature "has been made or entered into, or will be recog-
nized." Provisions which were more to the interest of the dealer, such as
that only cash or certified check would be accepted in payment for the car
and that the agreement would not become binding upon the dealer until
accepted by an officer of the company were printed in larger type on the
same page. The other side of the purchase order was described by the
court in the following terms:
The reverse side of the contract contains 8 inches of fine print.
It is not as small, however, as the two critical paragraphs described above.
The page is headed "Conditions" and contains ten separate paragraphs
consisting of 65 lines in all. The paragraphs do not have headnotes or
margin notes denoting their particular subject, as in the case of the "Owner
Service Certificate" to be referred to later. In the seventh paragraph,
about two-thirds of the way down the page, the warranty, which is the
focal point of the case, is set forth.50
The court then quoted verbatim the warranty paragraph. The first sen-
tence stated that no warranties express or implied were made by either
the dealer or the manufacturer except as stated in that paragraph. In the
succeeding sentences the manufacturer warranted each "new motor ve-
hicle (including original equipment placed thereon by the manufacturer
except tires) ... to be free from defects in material or workmanship
under normal use and service." 51 The manufacturer's liability under its
warranty was then expressly limited
to making good at its factory any part or parts thereof which shall, within
ninety (90) days after delivery of such vehicle to the original purchaser or
before such vehicle had been driven 4,000 miles, whichever event shall
first occur, be returned to it with transportation charges prepaid and
which its examination shall disclose to its satisfaction to have been thus
defective .... 52
" Id. at 367, 161 A.2d at 74.
id.
12 Id. (emphasis added).
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Finally any other warranties express or implied were again disclaimed as
were all other obligations and/or liabilities. At trial the manufacturer
and joint defendant, the Chrysler Corporation, apparently had the temer-
ity to argue that this warranty only ran to the original purchaser, to wit,
Bloomfield Motors, the dealer.5 3 Returning to the factual background, the
car was delivered with an Owner Service Certificate in it to Mr. Henning-
sen two days later. The Owner Service Certificate contained the same
provisions as those set forth on the back of the purchase order except that
an additional paragraph was added by which the court declared "the
dealer extends that warranty to the purchaser in the same manner as if
the word 'Dealer' appeared instead of the word 'Manufacturer.' "54 Less
than two weeks later, while Mrs. Henningsen was driving on a smooth
stretch of four lane highway, the car suddenly veered sharply to the right
and crashed into a highway sign and then into a brick wall. No other
vehicle was in any way involved.
At the trial an experienced insurance appraiser testified that there
must have been a mechanical failure in the steering mechanism. The trial
court felt that there was not enough evidence to permit the case to go to
the jury on a theory of negligence but did submit the case to the jury on
the theory of implied warranty of merchantability, i.e., that the car was not
reasonably fit for the general purpose for which it was sold. The jury
returned a verdict against both the dealer and the manufacturer, and the
defendants appealed from the judgment entered thereon. The plaintiffs,
Mr. and Mrs. Henningsen, thereupon cross-appealed from the dismissal of
their claim based upon negligence.
The great number of important legal issues involved in this case is
apparent. Were there any warranties running from the manufacturer to
Mr. Henningsen, the purchaser, and if so did they also run to Mrs. Hen-
ningsen, the ultimate user for whom the automobile was bought? What
611 think this is the fair purport on the court's finding that, despite the fact the
franchise agreement between Chrysler and its dealer expressly declared that the
dealer was not its agent, the dealer nevertheless acted as its agent to extend the war-
ranty to Henningsen. This finding was premised on a declaration that the courts
look to the factual relations between the parties in deciding whether an agency rela-
tionship exists. To support this position the court cited several cases in other states
which had held that "original purchaser" meant "the purchasing member of the
public." See id. at 373-75, 161 A.2d at 78. This portion of the court's opinion
would make no sense unless Chrysler had asserted in the trial of the case that the
manufacturer's warranty which ran to the "original purchaser" did not run to the
first purchasing member of the public.
1' Id. at 368, 161 A.2d at 75.
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was the effect of the disclaimer of all other express and implied warran-
ties, and of imposing a limitation of liability under all warranties made to
the original purchaser? What warranties were made by the dealer and to
whom? If there was an implied warranty of merchantability was there
sufficient proof of its breach? The plaintiffs' cross-appeal raised the further
issues of whether their complaint stated a cause of action for negligence,
and, if so, whether there was sufficient proof to take the case to the jury.
The single issue upon which Dworkin focused was the effect of the dis-
claimer of all warranties express or implied other than those stated in the
purchase order and in the Owner Service Certificate.55 This was not
necessarily the most important or difficult point before the court, but that
of course is beside the point. Dworkin claims that at the time the Hen-
ningsen case was brought there was a definitely ascertainable pre-existing
rule of law which provided that, on the facts of the Henningsen case, the
disclaimer was effective to prevent the arising of any implied warranty
of merchantability. Dworkin did not put the matter quite so affirmative-
ly. Rather, as he stated the issue, the plaintiffs were arguing that, at
least on the circumstances of their case, the manufacturer ought not to be
protected by this limitation, but plaintiffs were "not able to point to any
statute, or to any established rule of law, that prevented the manufacturer
from standing on the contract." 56 This obviously amounts to saying that
there was a pre-existing rule of law that on these facts the manufacturer
could rely on the disclaimer. Otherwise one would be forced to conclude
that there was no applicable pre-existing rule of law, and the context makes
perfectly clear that this is not what Dworkin is saying. Indeed, later on in
his article, when referring in capsule form to his discussion of the Henning-
sen case, Dworkin specifically states "in Henningsen certain rules about
automobile manufacturer's liability were altered on the basis of the prin-
ciples and policies I quoted from the opinion of the court. '5 7 Because
the rule that the disclaimer was effective existed and was applicable, under
Dworkin's analytical scheme the court was bound to apply it or change it
From the court's failure to apply the rule, Dworkin invokes his familiar
notion of principles, the content of which he takes from the court's general
statements about public policy, to justify the departure from what he con-
siders the accepted pre-existing rule of law on the subject.
" See Dworkin, supra note 1, at 24.
57 1d.
1 7 Id. at 38.
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Again, I submit that this analysis is seriously inadequate and inac-
curate. I do not believe any experienced lawyer examining this case
could conclude that on any issue involved there was or was not a clearly
applicable pre-existing legal rule. If anything, this case demonstrates that
looking at the facts of a case does not permit the conclusion that there is
only one valid legal rule applicable to the case-all other asserted rules
being invalid-and that the rule can be exhaustively stated. Indeed, on
every point at issue there was authority pointing both ways, and the New
Jersey court did a superb job of marshalling the authorities. The court
pointed out, in regard to the issue of privity, how that concept had been
extended to include contemplated users of foodstuffs and to persons like
the Henningsens who bought the item in question partly as the result of
advertising representations made by the manufacturer directly to them over
the radio, -television, and other mass media.58 Indeed, on all the disputed
issues I believe most sophisticated observers would have said that the
plaintiffs' case was the stronger. Returning, however, to the specific point
put in issue by Dworkin, the pre-existing legal effect of the disclaimer, the
court never for one moment agreed that there was a pre-existing rule of
law that, on the facts before it, the disclaimer was effective. No New
Jersey case had ever so held. There was a New Jersey case which stated
what the Henningsen court called a general principle, but what Dworkin
would probably call a rule of law, to the effect that in the absence of
fraud one who does not choose to read a contract before signing it cannot
later relieve himself of its burdens.59 Leaving aside that under conven-
tional case analysis broad statements such as this are only dicta, there
was authority in New Jersey to the effect that, even in the absence of
fraud, contract disclaimer clauses could be avoided. This authority
appeared subsequent to the formulation of the so-called general rule
which Dworkin seems to think stated the New Jersey law on the sub-
ject, but well prior to the Henningsen case. In 1911 the Court of Errors
and Appeals in New Jersey had thrown out a disclaimer on a baggage check
that limited the liability of a common carrier for loss or damage in transit.60
In 1951, in a case decided on other grounds, the Appellate Division of the
New Jersey Superior Court had questioned the validity of clauses on stop
11 See 32 N.J. at 378-84, 412-17, 161 A.2d at 80-84, 99-101.
Id. at 386, 161 A.2d at 84. The case was Fivey v. Pennsylvania R.R., 67
N.J.L. 627, 52 A. 472 (E&A 1902), and it involved the effect of a Telease given
by a worker who had received benefits from a "relief fund."
11 Hill v. Adams Express Co., 82 NJ.L. 373, 81 A. 859 (E&A 1911).
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payment orders exonerating the bank from liability.61 In the light of this
New Jersey authority as well as the many, many cases in other states in-
volving these and other types of contracts of adhesion where the public
has no option but to use a printed form prepared by the disclaiming
party,62 it is extremely difficult to understand how anyone could categori-
cally assert the validity of such clauses as a pre-existing rule of New Jersey
law. If one could have stated anything on the point beforehand it was
that, in the absence of proof that the clause had been brought to plain-
tiffs' attention, the disclaimer would most probably be held invalid. What
would have been difficult to predict is whether the disclaimer would be
held invalid because it was not brought to the Henningsens' attention or
because, in the context in which it was procured, it was unfairly obtained.
There was authority for both positions. The New Jersey court chose the
latter. Of course the court referred to public policy. There was no
reason why it should not have. But that reference was not because it
lacked sound narrow "legal" grounds as well for its decision. Indeed, the
court cited reasons which would have entitled it to throw out the disclaimer
on other grounds as well. Not only was there an apparently conscious at-
tempt to bury it and the warranty in a maze of print, but the warranty to
which the disclaimer was attached was worded to confuse the purchaser.
The warranty from the manufacturer was apparently drafted to run only to
the original purchaser. No attempt was made to explain to prospective pur-
chasers, such as the Henningsens, that this did not include them, but only
the dealer. Furthermore, the manufacturer was obliged to honor its limited
warranty only after the original purchaser had at his own expense shipped
the part (the whole car?) back to the factory and proved to the manufac-
turer's satisfaction that the part was defective as to material or workman-
ship. Such provisions raise serious mutuality problems, to say the least. As
against the dealer, the plaintiffs' case was stronger because the single rele-
vant piece of paper that Mr. Henningsen actually signed-the purchase
order-only contained a disclaimer by the manufacturer and none by the
dealer whose own disclaimer was contained in the Owner Service Certifi-
cate which was on the front seat of the car when it was delivered.
" Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co., 16 NJ. Super. 430, 436,
84 A.2d 741, 743-44 (App. Div. 1951), affd per curiam, 9 NJ. 607, 89 A.2d 242
(1952) (release held invalid because given without consideration).
"'These cases are copiously cited by the Henningsen court. See 32 N.J. at 388-
98, 161 A.2d 86-91.
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IV. CONCLUSION
While one must apologize for this long discussion of the cases, it was
essential to demonstrate not only their failure to support Dworkin's thesis
but also to show that Dworkin's analysis is just plain wrong. One cannot
exhaustively state legal rules so that the statement of the rule includes the
complete statement of its exceptions. Furthermore the decision as to when
a legal rule is or is not applicable is a very difficult one. I would say it is the
most difficult task in the law. As a corollary, two or more different but
not necessarily contradictory rules are often apparently applicable to the
same situation, and this overlapping is not always solved by the invalida-
tion of one such rule. There are a lot of things wrong with the Model
of Rules. One is that trying to state what the rules are in sufficiently pre-
cise terms is an impossible task. Rules are helpful tools if one does not
take them too seriously and expect too much of them. Whatever defects
are contained in the Model of Rules are not, however, cured by the asser-
tion of a sharp distinction between rules and principles, which are not
vague rules but something different. In fact one might say that Dworkin's
principles are themselves closer to what most people would call rules. The
sharp distinction between principles and rules that Dworkin draws is simply
not supported by the cases. Without this support his two level decision-
making procedure, advanced to show that judges never have discretion in
the strong sense when, according to the positivists, the legal rules in point
are open-textured, collapses. The cases show rather that questions of
policy and questions of the applicability of so-called legal rules are decided
together and not separately.
Nevertheless, the crucial inquiry which Dworkin has very ably isolated
is how much leeway if any do judges have in the decision of cases, par-
ticularly the so-called difficult cases where one is inclined to say that
different judges might for a variety of reasons, including those of personal-
ity, decide the case differently. Dworkin suggests that in such cases
judges could decide the case wrongly and, given a particular constitutional
framework, the decision whether right or wrong could be unreviewable
and thus final. So far we would all agree. Dworkin goes further, how-
ever, and states that it is error to conclude, even within limits, that judges
can decide such cases as they wish. We are waiting to see how or why
this is so or even whether it should be so. It is certainly not because
there is a clear-cut distinction between rules and principles so that, when
rules conflict or are inapplicable, we can retreat to a different logical level
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where judges' choices are still controlled and decide the case on principle.
If the positivists have said anything it is that as we leave what most
of us would agree is the "core"' meaning of any rule, precedent or statute,
we have difficulty applying the rule, precedent, or statute. Dworkin ig-
nores this question and implies that it is easy to answer. But how do we
answer this almost insoluble question occasioned by the vagueness of
language and the perfectly natural human impulse to attempt to generalize
our experience and expectations? A la Dworkin we might point to things
called principles which are just vaguer examples of the same type of en-
tities. Thus, to take the case of rules, since we have difficulty in formu-
lating and applying rules because of the vagueness of language, we look for
even vaguer rules called principles to help us out of our difficulty. Presum-
ably, if we have difficulty in applying principles we would look to still
vaguer rules, which we would perhaps call maxims or second-order princi-
ples, and so on ad infinitum.63 This may be in fact what courts do, but to
assert that this process shows that courts are not free to decide at least some
cases in accordance with individual predilections is a non sequitur. If any-
thing, it shows the opposite to be true. The broader the inquiry made by
the judge the easier it is to find support for any of a number of possible de-
cisions in any given case. The principle of "freedom of contract" is count-
ered by the principle of "unjust bargain" which in turn is countered by
the principle or maxim of "primacy of the legislature in making changes
in the law," and so on. In sum, if we wish to show that judges are cir-
cumscribed in the results they can reach even in the so-called difficult case,
we may have to try a fresh approach. A legal universe of rules and prin-
ciples will simply not do the job. Perhaps the answer is to abandon the
attempt to define or analyze law in terms of either rules or principles or
both together and try another tack. My own belief is that this is precise-
ly what will have to be done to make any progress in this direction.
"This is how Professor Hughes looks at the operation of the legal system. See
note 17 supra.
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